Building on the negotiation of U.S. bilateral investment treaties beginning in the early 1980s, U.S. free trade agreements incorporating specific host-state obligations to foreign investors and binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) have been a feature of U.S. trade and investment policy since 1992 (when the NAFTA negotiations were concluded). Presidents
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Page | 4 (TPP) includes ISDS provisions applicable to all Parties including Australia, albeit with some exceptions. 16 U.S. BITs for the most part have not been particularly controversial, presumably in large part because a) all to date have been concluded with developing nations, mostly small ones, or the nations of Eastern Europe which at the time were developing or emerging market nations; b) the obligations, including ISDS, are reciprocal but the likelihood of, for example, a Uruguayan enterprise demanding arbitration of a claim against the United States Government, is small; and c) BITs are concluded as treaties with the advice and consent of two thirds of the senators present and voting. 17 As the provisions of U.S. BITs are considered either self-executing or enforceable through existing legislation, 18 the House of Representatives typically has no direct role in their approval. Controversy has arisen primarily during the negotiation (or revision) of model BITs in 2004 and 2012 , where the disagreement between business interests on one side and organized labor and environmentalists on the other has been predictable, and well after the first of the NAFTA Chapter 11 actions against the United States had made headlines and empowered opponents of ISDS who feared, inter alia, interference with regulatory actions.
Still, the most significant debates have been in the context of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation enacted in 2002 and re-enacted after an eight year hiatus in 2015. The possible conclusion of BIT negotiations between the United States in China, underway for more than five years but with the negotiations progressing only recently, 19 will likely raise the ISDS controversy to a previously unknown level if and when a BIT text is concluded and made public. Significantly, the defenders of ISDS, principally the U.S. Government and the U.S. business community, have focused more extensively on the many modifications to the NAFTA model incorporated in all U.S. FTAs and BITs concluded since 2003, while most of the opponents largely ignore the changes, directing their opposition instead toward the perceived undesirability of ISDS (and protection of U.S. investments abroad) more generally. This paper is structured as follows: Part II discusses the NAFTA chapter 11 as reflection of 1980s and early 1990s BITs, and practical experience under NAFTA and concerns raised 16 Australia, Chile and Singapore FTAs, the first post-NAFTA investment chapters to reflect a new approach to protecting foreign investment in FTAs, and briefly notes the changes in the later Bush Administration FTAs. Part IV considers other more recent developments relating to U.S. policy on investment in FTAs and BITS. Part V discusses the 2015 TPA, while Part VI summarizes the further refinements embodied in Chapter 9 of the TPP (many of which reflect the more recent United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)). 20 The final Part VII speculates on how the revised features of TPP may affect ISDS among the twelve TPP Parties (assuming of course that the TPP eventually enters into force).
II. NAFTA's Investment Provisions and Experience under Chapter 11
A. NAFTA's Precursors NAFTA Chapter 11 is based on U.S. BITs negotiated earlier, and on the model BIT completed in 1984. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss BIT provisions in extensive detail. 21 Rather, the analysis is focused on the inclusion of ISDS and related BIT and investment chapter provisions in such areas as fair and equitable treatment, expropriation and transparency. Critically, U.S. BITs and investment chapters have permitted individual foreign investors to bring actions against foreign government that were party to the agreements, without any requirement of approval or participation by the investor's home government.
Among the innovations of the 1984 U.S. model BIT (first announced in 1982 but later modified) and the many agreements negotiated using the model as the basis for negotiations, was the inclusion of ISDS, which had already been made part of many of the BITs concluded by European nations. As one commentator noted, The treaties are genuinely new in this regard. While the assumption of continuing amicable relations between the protected investor and the host State is implicit in the BITs, the treaties guarantee investors access to a neutral arbitral forum in which to present any claims. To this end, the signatories consent to international arbitral jurisdiction in the BITs, and the treaties establish mechanisms to ensure that arbitration may proceed even if the host State refused to cooperate.
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That being said, the ISDS provisions in the early U.S. treaties, and in the 1984 model BIT, were less explicit than in later agreements, although perhaps equally effective in requiring binding arbitration upon the demand of the foreign investor. Preliminary Draft: Please do not quote or cite without the author's express written consent and negotiation between the investor and the host government failed, arbitration was mandatory, requiring that "the dispute shall be submitted for settlement in accordance with previously agreed, applicable dispute-settlement procedures."
23 Still, such "previously agreed" procedures are to a great extent incorporated in the 1984 model BIT language, which provides that each (government) Party consents to submission of such disputes to binding arbitration at ICSID or, where the Centre is not available because the host government is not a party to ICSID, to the ICSID Additional Facility.
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Including Chapter 11 in NAFTA was thus not a radical move for the United States. The sources were the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (for the obligations to the investor), various U.S. BITs and the 1992 "model" BIT (for ISDS). 25 The inclusion in NAFTA of international law standards for the treatment of foreign investment along with a compulsory third-party arbitration procedure to settle investment disputes, is rightly viewed as a major achievement for the Departments of State, Treasury and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) as well as the U.S. business community, considering that it overcame many decades of Mexico's adherence to the Calvo Clause 26 and a long and troubled history of investment disputes between Mexico the United States, including the petroleum industry expropriation in 1938. 27 What was radical was the inclusion for the first time of ISDS in an agreement with another developed nation (Canada).
B.
The NAFTA Experience
Over 22 years NAFTA has generated more than 50 ISDS claims. Of the 17 against the United States only seven have reached the award stage, and the United States has yet to be required to pay an award to a foreign claimant. 28 The majority of the claims, some 35 Preliminary Draft: Please do not quote or cite without the author's express written consent Page | 7 (including notices of arbitration for cases that were never pursued), have been filed and in many instances litigated between two developed nations, investors of the United States against Canada, and vice versa. 29 (In contrast, as far as the author has been able to determine, only one case has been brought by a foreign investor under any BIT or any other FTA investment chapter against the United States, and in three years the latter proceeding, under CAFTA-DR, has not progressed beyond the "notice of intent to arbitrate" stage. 30 ) Only one case has been brought by a Canadian investor against Mexico.
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The most frequently articulated government and NGO (and some state government) concerns have centered on the preservation of government authority to regulate without facing liability for such actions as regulations to preserve the environment or to support public health and safety. They also relate to the allegations that foreign investors in the United States have greater rights to compensation than U.S. citizens under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Because literature elsewhere extensively analyzes the NAFTA and post-NAFTA changes in investment chapters, 32 this discussion is restricted to the highlights in terms of changes in provisions relating to fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, transparency in the arbitral proceedings and various procedural issues designed to eliminate frivolous claims from the outset, particularly as reflected in the AUSFTA and TTP.
Judging from the cases litigated under NAFTA and the attacks on Chapter 11, the most significant and controversial investors' protections in Chapter 11, Sec In addition to the key provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, additional concerns surfaced over the lack of transparency in "secret" ISDS proceedings and concerns that foreign investors through NAFTA and subsequent agreements had acquired greater rights than U.S. investors under the U.S. Constitution, both as discussed below, as well as worries that arbitral tribunal would join procedural issues with the substance of the claims, resulting in a prolongation of the process (and the costs associated therewith) even where the claim is ultimately dismissed.
Explicit opposition to Chapter 11 did not spread until after the first Chapter 11 case was filed by the Ethyl Corporation, in April 1997. 45 The process was publicly attacked by a prominent anti-trade NGO, Public Citizen: Ethyl Corporation's $251 million lawsuit against a new Canadian environmental law should set off alarm bells throughout the public interest world. The suit, brought under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement, demonstrates the serious danger that present and future international economic pacts could pose to environmental regulations and other laws that protect the public.
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While the Ethyl case was settled in the aftermath of a finding adverse to the Canadian government by a Canadian federal-provincial dispute settlement arbitration panel, 47 the controversy generated and the concerns of opponents were on-going, particularly with regard to the Methanex and Loewen cases against the United States (discussed infra) and the Pope and Talbot and S.D. Myers cases against Canada.
The ensuing NAFTA-based litigation changed many views. As one then senior U.S. State Department official, Mark Clodfelter, commented seven years after NAFTA entered into force, the United States Government, and for that matter Canada and Mexico, 44 See NAFTA, art. 1116. "… took a very big step into the unknown when they signed onto Chapter 11. The NAFTA Parties have waived sovereign immunity from claims to an extent far greater than they have consented to the jurisdiction, for example, of the International Court of Justice. They have agreed to be answerable to private claimants before arbitral tribunals that are subject to only very limited review. Even though the United States has been party to a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling Chapter 11, we have never done so with states that have so much investment in our territory. 48 This was radical, because the United States had never concluded a BIT in the past with another developed country, although that aspect of the coverage of Chapter 11 does not appear to have received much U.S. government attention until well after the fact, when thoughtful officials such as Mr. Clodfelter commented on it.
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The cases against the United States have inevitably involved not only the State Department and USTR, but also domestic agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency (the latter particularly for the Methanex claim that raised environmental issues arising out of California's banning of a gasoline additive for environmental -or perhaps political -reasons). This created a potential for conflict between on the one hand national agencies that are principally concerned with encouraging U.S. investment abroad and foreign trade (State and USTR) and, on the other hand, those that are more concerned with defending federal government and state actions 50 allegedly inconsistent with Chapter 11, such as the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the Department of the Interior or the Environmental Protection Agency.
Most of the controversies that have led to at least some reevaluation of U.S. government support of investment disputes fall into one of several areas. First, there are differences arising from conflicts between trade and "legitimate" government regulatory action, including but not limited to actions protecting the environment. This is particularly true with regard to the expropriation provision, Article 1110. Second, concerns exist, primarily among non-governmental organizations and some Members of Congress, regarding the appropriateness of having NAFTA tribunals effectively review decisions of U.S. state and federal courts. Third, there exists an articulated concern, albeit probably unjustified, by the same NGOs and their supporters in Congress that foreign citizens may have achieved greater substantive rights regarding investment in U.S. territory under NAFTA than do American citizens under the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 51 Fourth, broad dissatisfaction is expressed over the lack of transparency of the arbitral process, whereby under the original NAFTA Chapter 11 (before modifications in 2001 and 2003), the proceedings, including the pleadings and hearings, were conducted largely in secret.
The Methanex case 52 aptly illustrates the concerns by the NAFTA governments and civil society over "regulatory takings" that could require compensation. The Canadian firm Methanex challenged the action of the State of California in banning the gasoline additive methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) because of the perceived risk that it might pollute the underground water supply. These measures were characterized by the claimant both directly and indirectly as "tantamount to expropriation." The arbitral tribunal did not ultimately reach the question of whether California's action constituted a compensable taking under Article 1110. Rather, it determined that the connection between the California MTBE ban and Methanex' operations was not "legally significant" so as to satisfy the "relating to" language in NAFTA, Article 1101. (Methanex manufactured methanol, the primary component of MTBE, not MTBE itself.) Ultimately, the tribunal dismissed all claims by Methanex against the United States on the merits, rejecting as well Methanex' claims of violations of national treatment and fair and equitable treatment. Anti-NAFTA groups in the United States had also seized on Loewen as "an all-out attack on democracy. If successful, it would undermine the jury system, which is fundamental to our system of justice." 54 In Loewen, a Louisiana state court trial, conducted in with obvious prejudice to the Canadian investor, rendered a state anti-trust verdict against Loewen (a Canadian operator of funeral homes in Louisiana). The jury found a few million dollars' worth of actual damages, plus approximately $400 million in punitive damages. 55 Because the claimant apparently could not meet bonding requirements for an appeal, set at $625 million under Louisiana law, Loewen settled the case for $175 million "under conditions of extreme duress." Eventually it brought a Chapter 11 claim against the United States. Among Loewen's contentions was that actions of the Louisiana trial court, the excessive monetary judgment and the bonding requirements amounted to a denial of justice and of fair and equitable treatment by the Louisiana courts in violation of NAFTA, Article 1105 and of customary international law. The arbitral proceedings were initially dismissed on procedural 51 Preliminary Draft: Please do not quote or cite without the author's express written consent grounds, with the Tribunal holding that availability of the Chapter 11 mechanism had been lost when Loewen, in bankruptcy, transferred its interests to a U.S. firm. In extensive dicta, the Tribunal analyzed the Louisiana state court proceedings at considerable length, characterizing them as a "disgrace." However, the tribunal nevertheless concluded in further dicta that the decision was not cognizable under NAFTA and international law because Loewen had not received a final court verdict within the United States court system, and there had thus not been a denial of justice (in addition to the loss of Canadian nationality of the corporate claimant).
A subsequent ruling by the arbitral tribunal, after Raymond Loewen, one of the individual claimants, asserted his continuous Canadian citizenship, necessarily resulted in a decision on the merits, converting the earlier dictum into a holding that the action of the Mississippi court did not meet the international law threshold of a denial of justice for lack of exhaustion of national judicial remedies by the Claimants.
A few years later, evidence surfaced that one of the arbitrators in Loewen, former Congressman and U.S. appellate court judge Abner Mikva, had been improperly influenced by the U.S. Department of Justice while serving on the tribunal. As Judge Mikva related the incident at a conference in 2004, a Justice Department official had said to Mikva, "You know judge, if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA." Mikva recounted his answer as, "Well, if you want to put pressure on me, than that does it." 56 This remarkable exchange confirms the extraordinary level of concern felt by U.S. government officials when the United States was respondent in controversial ISDS proceedings (and may explain a puzzling, pro-U.S. Government result in a case which many observers expected to be won by Loewen).
Of course, whether the regulatory actions such as those challenged in Methanex and attacks on state court decisions, as in Loewen, are "valid" is to be determined by the adjudicatory process. However, the mere possibility that they might do so was enough to lead the American private sector and U.S. government to the barricades. For example, environmental groups have been highly critical of the repeated use of investor protection provisions "to challenge the host country's environmental laws and administrative decisions," noting that, "the provisions designed to ensure security and predictability for the investors have created uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental regulators. Certain changes in ISDS procedures that arguably did not require amendment of NAFTA were made by the NAFTA Parties in response to public criticism of the process. In July 2001, the Parties issued an "interpretation" as permitted under Chapter 11, declaring that NAFTA did not require the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and pledging with a few exceptions to make all arbitral documents "available to the public in a timely manner." 59 (Business confidential information and privileged governmental information were to remain confidential, in both pleadings and hearings.) Fully two years later, after the enactment of TPA in 2002 (discussed below), the United States and Canada stated that they would consent to opening hearings in Chapter 11 disputes.
60 Such transparency provisions have been included with minor variations in all subsequent BITs and FTA investment provisions negotiated by the United States. Procedures were also initiated to permit amicus curiae briefs, first accepted by a NAFTA tribunal in 2003. 61 Each of the NAFTA governments maintains a website where documents can be found.
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The NAFTA Parties also attempted in the Interpretation to limit the scope of the "minimum standard of treatment" under Article 1105 by emphasizing inter alia that "The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."
63 (This was designed to deal in part with the apparently inadvertent omission of "customary" before "international law" in Article 1105.) This Interpretation language has also been included in subsequent U.S. FTAs and BITs as discussed below. 
III
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The various pressures on the George W. Bush Administration and Congress to introduce changes led to new negotiating instructions in the President's TPA for 2002, legislation which was effectively necessary for the President and his U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to undertake their ambitious plans for regional trade agreements. Without limiting the Congress to up or down votes (preventing Congress from amending the texts after the fact to favor U.S. interests), and without requiring specific time limits for Congressional consideration, other countries simply have not been willing to give their last, best positions during the FTA negotiations. 64 The statutory negotiating objectives in TPA, one of the benefits for Congress in the TPA compromise, thus become critical since if they are not followed Congress may well refuse to approve the resulting agreement (although to date this has not occurred under TPA). As the Congressional Research Service describes the situation with TPA, To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to pursue in trade negotiations. Although the executive branch has some discretion over implementing these goals, they are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that the Administration is expected to honor, if it expects trade agreement implementing legislation to be considered under expedited rules. For this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center of the congressional debate on TPA.
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In the debate the pro-investment protection contingent of business and government have generally prevailed on the basic principles needed to protect American investors abroad, although groups advocating the inclusion of strong labor rights and environmental provisions also succeeded to the extent of having them included in TPA, 66 albeit without the right to bring labor and environmental actions directly against Parties to the agreements. Still, beginning with the 2002 TPA the investment protection pendulum has swung to a very significant degree toward host governments and away from unfettered investor rights. With regard to investment, many major changes from the NAFTA approach were ultimately adopted. These included inter alia provisions related to minimum standard of treatment; expropriation, 64 
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Page | 15 particularly indirect expropriation; transparency, including amicus briefs; procedures to deal with frivolous claims; and provision for an appellate mechanism to review arbitral decisions. 67 Predictably, these changes did not satisfy the opponents of FTAs or ISDS. As Public Citizen argued when President George W. Bush proposed to include ISDS in TPA, "this extraordinary mechanism empowers private investors and corporations to sue NAFTA-signatory governments in special tribunals to obtain cash compensation for government policies or actions that investors believe violate their new rights under NAFTA." Further, such investor protections, claimed to be necessary to protect investors from expropriation, instead permit investors to "challenge environmental laws, regulations and government decisions at the state and local level . . . ." 68 It is significant that despite the changes TPA passed in late 2002 with only a one vote majority in the House of Representatives.
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Following the enactment of 2002 TPA, in the AUSFTA an annex was included (which also appears as an annex in the Chile FTA and as an exchange of letters in the United StatesSingapore Free Trade Agreement), designed to restrict significantly and legally the scope of the "indirect" expropriation provisions as they may apply to government regulatory activities.
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The focus was on protecting "legitimate" government regulatory actions from being treated as compensable indirect expropriations, in part through incorporating U.S. takings law, reflecting the TPA language that foreign investors not be "accorded greater substantive rights 
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Page | 16 with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States." Thus, subparagraphs 4 (a) (i) to (iii) were based on Penn Central, a U.S. Supreme Court case involving an unsuccessful action against New York City claiming that restricting air rights above the terminal (where the claimant had wanted to build a skyscraper) was not a compensable taking in part because it did not deprive Penn Central of reasonable economic use of its property. 71 The negotiators presumably looked as well as other Supreme Court precedents, such as Lucas, where the Court found a compensable taking when the government action deprived the claimant of all economically viable use of his land.
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The "except in rare circumstances" language was apparently intended to be a clear statement, also reflecting U.S. supreme court jurisprudence, that in the absence of discrimination a presumption exists that the listed regulatory actions will not be treated as compensable expropriations by arbitral tribunals. This language also reflects the requirement in the 2002 TPA that foreign investors not be accorded greater substantive rights than U.S. citizens litigating in U.S. courts. 73 The assumption appears to have been that for many other countries, including Canada (which has no constitutionally mandated 5 th Amendment equivalent to protect private property), the protection offered by investment agreements in fact does provide broader substantive rights than local law and constitutions, particularly in nations where the rule of law is weak. The concept of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" also remains. Similarly, the troublesome concept of fair and equitable treatment received additional language in the Chile FTA (but not the AUSFTA) and in subsequent U.S. FTA investment chapters) to define and limit its scope to the narrow standard of customary international law.
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The Singapore and similar FTAs, including the AUSFTA, also included a side letter or annex clarifying: "the Parties' shared understanding that customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligations. With regard to Article 15.5 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refer to all customary international law principles that protected the economic rights and interests of aliens." 75 The Singapore and Chile FTAs and CAFTA-DR include treaty language on transparency similar to that included in the NAFTA Interpretation and follow-up statement, as reflected in the 2002 TPA negotiating objectives, providing for transparency of arbitral proceedings, including open hearings, publication on the Internet of all pleadings not containing business confidential or privileged information. 76 The Singapore FTA also provides that "Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made," in an attempt (likely reflecting the lengthy Methanex proceedings) to convince arbitral tribunals to resolve procedural issues at the outset.
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Both the Singapore and Chile FTAs also include new language in the ISDS provisions that explicitly covers investment authorizations and investment agreements. 78 Such language has been consistently included in subsequent U.S. FTAs, such as the KORUS and TPP. As a result of these BTD mandated changes, which were incorporated into amendments to the pending FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea, the FTA with Peru was promptly approved in November 2007 and went into force the following year. The other three were not approved by Congress until almost 2010 and entered into force in 2011. However, these FTAs contained investment provisions that differed in only minor respects from the Australia/Chile/Singapore genre of FTAs.
The 2012 Model BIT, 83 despite its three years in gestation and resumption of the debate between pro and anti-ISDS contingents, made relatively minor changes to the 2004 Model BIT. 84 As the State Department explained, "The Administration made several important changes to the BIT text so as to enhance transparency and public participation; sharpen the disciplines that address preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, including the distortions created by certain indigenous innovation policies; and strengthen protections relating to labor and the environment." 85 V.
2015 Trade Promotion Authority
The debate over TPA during the first half of 2015 was perhaps the most vituperative and public in history; because of the timing the TPA opposition has been difficult to separate from opposition to TPP, particularly where investment issues and transparency have been at the forefront. This has probably been due to several factors. These include a) the widespread use of the Internet and social media, which has facilitated the ease with which critics can make their views widely known; b) the decision of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, a former Harvard law professor and liberal voice with many admirers, to assume the leadership of the anti-trade, anti ISDS, anti-TPA, and anti-TPP forces among the public and in the Senate; and c) the unfortunate decision of the Obama Administration to wait until the beginning of 2014 before formally requesting TPA from the Congress. These factors virtually guaranteed that the TPA opponents would be able to join TPP opponents to present a united front. 87 The anti-TPA/anti-TPP/anti-trade agreement campaign mounted by the labor unions and the supporters in Congress was more effective (even though it ultimately failed) than at any time in the past in initially blocking TPA, again in part because they had ample time to organize their opposition, as well as because public concerns over the negative effects of past FTAs on American workers, whether or not accurate, were probably more pronounced in 2015 than at any time in the past.
Opponents of ISDS (and of TPA, TPP and trade agreements more generally) have had a new and highly articulate spokesperson in Senator Warren, who has become "the national face of opposition to Mr. Obama on the trade package." 88 In an op-ed piece for the Washington Post, Senator Warren attacked ISDS: "Agreeing to ISDS in this enormous new treaty [TPP] would tilt the playing field in the United States further in favor of big multinational corporations. Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty."
89 She denounced discrimination, whereby American labor unions seeking action against Vietnamese violations of trade agreements would have to make their case not in ISDS but only in Vietnamese courts. 90 The latter assertion was a misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise. However, the underlying discrimination argument was valid. While the inclusion of labor provisions in the TPP (and the TPA negotiating objectives) would subject Vietnam to dispute settlement under the state-tostate provisions of the TPP should Vietnam fail to enforce effectively its labor laws and the core ILO labor standards, 91 unlike investors who can bring disputes directly against foreign government under the investment chapters, labor disputes can be brought only where the labor advocates in the United States convince the U.S. government to bring a case. Warren's attack on ISDS also mentioned the controversial Vattenfall and Philip Morris ISDS proceedings, and complained that "Giving foreign corporations special rights to challenge our laws outside 87 By the beginning of 2014 the President was sufficiently unpopular for a variety of reasons (and distasteful of rough-and-tumble politics) that both the Majority leader of the Senate, Harry Reid (D, Nevada) and the minority leader in the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, were able to successfully demand that consideration of TPA legislation be put off until after the November 2014 elections. No parts of this debate changed the content of TPA negotiating objectives in major respects as they relate to ISDS and related investment issues. The treatment of key areas such as fair and equitable treatment; expropriation; transparency; procedures to eliminate frivolous claims; endorsement of an appellate body, as well as the continuing overarching desire to limit foreign investor rights in the United States to those enjoyed by U.S. citizens, all differ significantly from NAFTA. However, the actual negotiating objectives language in this newest version of TPA reflects only relatively minor innovations beyond the extensive shifts reflected in the 2002 TPA and in the U.S. FTAs with Chile, Australia and Singapore, along with the single modification required in the Bipartisan Trade Deal of 2007, all as discussed earlier in this article.
VI. TPP's Investment Provisions
This enactment of TPA gave the Obama Administration at long last the authority it needed to conclude the TPP, without the need for any major changes, at least in the investment area. Ironically, the last issues to be resolved in TPP were largely unrelated to ISDS (dairy market access in Canada, rice, beef and auto market access in Japan, sugar market access in the United States and Mexico and Canada's insistence on higher regional value content for autos and small trucks to protect their auto and auto parts industries' preferred access to the U.S. and Canadian markets, and U.S. efforts to expand patent protection for biologic drugs.) 101 With the negotiations completed and the text public the bitter debate among the Administration, most Republicans in Congress and business interests on one hand and most Democrats, organized Earlier opposition by Australia to ISDS in principle, and as reflected in the AUSFTA, seems to have disappeared with the most recent change in government. 105 A series of exceptions to national treatment and non-discrimination remains in TPP, as in previous FTAs. In addition, there are a number of important innovations beyond even the most recent U.S. FTA investment chapters and the 2015 TPA. As one expert observed, "TPP's chapter on Investment strengthens the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region, deters foreign governments from imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements on American investors, and protects the right to regulate in the, and building on U.S. experience since NAFTA, the innovations take investment agreements to a new level in terms of protecting host state discretion in such areas as guarding the government's regulatory discretion in such areas as public health and the environment." 106 Chapter 9 generally includes much language that is broadly similar to that of earlier U.S. FTAs (such as Singapore and CAFTA-DR) providing for preliminary consideration of procedural issues, 107 and for transparency in respect to arbitral pleadings and open hearings. 108 (This
VII. Conclusions
Should the TPP ultimately go into force for most if not all of the TPP Parties, it will establish a more host state friendly standard for ISDS, affording governments a new and higher level of regulatory flexibility. The practical significance of these changes will probably not be evident for at least several years after the TPP enters into force (2017 at the earliest). Some of the changes would have an obvious impact on future ISDS-for example, Phillip Morris could not bring an action under TPP, Chapter 9 against Australia or any other Party that resorts to plain-packaging rules for cigarettes (perhaps Canada). 140 In specific cases the other changes listed above could also become significant. This assumes of course that the TPP Parties who have other FTAs with investment chapters indicate clearly and unequivocally that TPP, Chapter 9 supersedes earlier investment provisions that may be more friendly to foreign investors and less protective of host state regulatory flexibility, such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA. The need for such indications is made necessary by the language in TPP that indicates that as a general rule TPP provisions should "coexist" with the WTO Agreements and the many free trade agreements to which one or more of the TPP Parties are also parties.
141 This is not an issue for the AUSFTA since it contains no ISDS obligations. However, with NAFTA, the prospect of Chapter 11 "coexisting" with TPP, Chapter 9, should be of considerable concern to the NAFTA Parties, since all NAFTA governments have assured their constituents that TPP provides them with a much higher level of regulatory flexibility. 
